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This article argues that in a stable and competitive real exchange-
rate (screr) macroeconomic regime, the exchange-rate component can 
drive up inflation through the very mechanisms that stimulate high rates of 
gross domestic product and employment growth; to offset this pressure, 
fiscal and monetary policies will have to be used to control aggregate 
demand. It finds that in an exchange-rate regime of this type, monetary 
policy has a degree of autonomy that can be exploited to apply active 
monetary policies. It analyses the degree to which monetary policy can 
be used to control aggregate demand and concludes that it cannot bear 
the main responsibility for this, which means that fiscal policy ought to be 
the main instrument for controlling aggregate demand.
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This paper examines some characteristics of  the 
stable and competitive real exchange-rate (screr) 
regime. After briefly describing the regime, section 
II argues that such an exchange rate may create 
permanent inflationary pressure through the very 
mechanisms that stimulate high rates of growth in 
gross domestic product (gdp) and employment. 
For an screr regime to be capable of controlling 
inflation, this pressure needs to be offset by the use 
of fiscal and monetary policies to control aggregate 
demand. Section III analyses monetary autonomy in 
an screr regime and finds that, generally speaking, 
there is a considerable degree of autonomy which 
can be exploited to implement active monetary 
policies. Section IV studies the scope for using 
monetary policy as the main instrument for 
controlling aggregate demand. The conclusion is 
that the main responsibility for controlling aggregate 
demand cannot be assigned to monetary policy, but 




The stable and competitive
real exchange-rate policy
For some time, and in a number of  papers, this 
author has been arguing that maintaining a stable 
and competitive real exchange rate (screr) is one 
of the most important contributions macroeconomic 
policy can make to growth and employment.1
In the first place, a competitive exchange rate 
creates an incentive to produce a wide range of 
internationally tradable products and sell them in 
the external or domestic market. When the range of 
potentially profitable products is increased, so is the 
potential for output and employment growth. Unlike 
other systems of incentives, this policy of promoting 
tradable activities (in preference to non-tradable ones) 
across the board does not give rise to rent-seeking. It 
can be combined with trade policy or other sector- or 
activity-specific incentives, but exchange-rate policy 
has a unique importance in a context of international 
  Earlier versions of  this study were presented at the cycle 
of  economic seminars organized by the Central Bank of  the 
Argentine Republic (10 April 2008) and at the first International 
Encounter of  the Brazilian Keynesian Association (Campinas, 
São Paulo, 18 April 2008). The comments received on those 
occasions were much appreciated. The author also wishes to 
thank two anonymous reviewers whose comments have been 
incorporated in the present version.
1 Frenkel (2004a, 2004b and 2006), Frenkel and Taylor (2007), 
Frenkel and Ros (2006), Frenkel and Rapetti (2008).
agreements that restrict the use of tariffs and subsidies. 
Via short- and long-term transmission channels 
that Frenkel (2004b) terms the “macroeconomic 
channel” and the “development channel”, respectively, 
a competitive exchange rate provides a powerful 
stimulus to growth and employment.
In the second place, an screr promotes greater 
labour intensity in both tradable and non-tradable 
activities. Through this channel, which Frenkel 
(2004b) calls the “labour intensity channel”, an 
screr provides a special stimulus for job creation 
on top of the employment effects of rising output.
In the third place, an screr plays a preventive 
role with regard to external and financial crises. 
Through its effects on the current account of  the 
balance of  payments and via the accumulation 
of  international reserves, an screr reduces the 
economy’s vulnerability to negative external shocks, 
both real and financial, and forestalls unsustainable 
trends in external borrowing.
What is the best exchange-rate policy for 
implementing an screr? The answer to this question 
needs to take account of the fact that the stability 
sought for the real exchange rate is not a short-term 
attribute. Real exchange-rate stability does not mean 
mechanically indexing the nominal exchange rate to 
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the difference between domestic and international 
inflation. The aim is to achieve stability over more 
extended periods. The main goal here is to reduce 
uncertainty about the real exchange rate over the time 
frames that matter for decisions about recruitment and 
investment in existing or new tradable activities.
Exchange-rate policy needs to combine short-
term flexibility with signals of commitment to a stable 
long-term real exchange rate. Nominal exchange-rate 
flexibility discourages short-term capital movements 
and tends to smooth the balance-of-payments capital 
account. It is good for there to be currency risk in 
the short term. Flexibility should characterize not 
just the price behaviour of the international currency, 
but also the behaviour of the monetary authority in 
the market. It means that the exchange rate is set in 
the currency market and that in the short term the 
monetary authority has no commitments with regard 
to that price. This type of intervention cannot fall 
victim to speculative attacks and retains the ability to 
respond to international market volatility. Managed 
floating practices2 of this kind can be encountered 
in the recent experience of  the region’s leading 
economies and of many emerging markets and seem 
to be the best form of intervention for implementing 
an screr in today’s circumstances.
1. The screr macroeconomic regime
There are two aspects of the screr policy that this 
author has been highlighting since it was originally 
proposed in Frenkel (2004a). The first is that the 
exchange-rate policy sketched out here needs to 
be part of  a wider framework that includes fiscal 
and monetary policies consistent with it. For one 
thing, preserving an screr cannot be the sole 
objective of macroeconomic policies. For another, 
the latter (exchange-rate, monetary and fiscal 
policies) are interconnected and have to be designed 
and implemented consistently. For these reasons, 
the proposal for a competitive real exchange-rate 
target needs to be understood as a component of a 
macroeconomic policy regime capable of pursuing 
multiple conflicting objectives in a consistent way. 
This regime needs to pursue growth, employment, 
activity level and inflation objectives simultaneously. 
The screr is an intermediate goal of the regime, as 
a given interest rate might be for monetary policy, 
or a given primary surplus for fiscal policy.
2 See Bofinger and Wollmershäuser (2003).
The second aspect is the need to coordinate 
macroeconomic policies within a governmental 
authority that has strong powers of  analysis and 
decision-making. It could be argued that coordinated 
policy management is advantageous under any 
regime.3 But under the screr regime, coordination 
is indispensable. With this regime, the three types 
of macroeconomic policy –exchange-rate, monetary 
and fiscal– are all active and contribute jointly to the 
attainment of policy goals. Since these goals conflict, 
there must be a single guiding authority to ensure 
that policies are mutually complementary.
2. The screr as a driver of aggregate demand
A special feature of  the screr macroeconomic 
regime is that exchange-rate policy is constantly 
acting as a powerful driver of  aggregate demand 
and employment. It is precisely in these effects on 
the demand for locally produced tradable goods, for 
investment and for labour that much of this regime’s 
ability to stimulate output and employment growth 
is manifested. For the same reason, its exchange-rate 
policy component can set up inflationary pressures 
that do not exist with other exchange-rate regimes.4 
The degree of  inflationary pressure will depend 
on the structure of  the economy and also on the 
circumstances it is going through. Where structure is 
concerned, for example, the effects will be different 
if  an economy where a large subsistence sector 
is continually swelling the labour supply (China, 
for example) is compared to an economy where 
this characteristic is absent, such as Argentina. As 
3 Although there are some who argue that it is better to segment 
objectives and give a particular institution exclusive responsibility 
for each of them, one example being an independent central bank 
that takes exclusive responsibility for inflation.
4 The idea that an screr is inflationary is widely held among 
economists. Two different ideas underlie this belief in mainstream 
thinking. One is that the real exchange rate necessarily tends 
towards its long-term equilibrium; if  the real exchange rate 
is depreciated (in relation to its long-term equilibrium) and 
exchange-rate policy prevents nominal appreciation, it is believed 
that real exchange-rate equilibrium will tend to be brought about 
by a rising trend in domestic prices. The other idea is monetary, 
the belief  being that central bank purchases in the currency 
market to maintain a depreciated exchange rate will expand the 
quantity of money and induce inflation. There is no notion that 
fiscal and monetary policies can contain inflation in a context 
where exchange-rate policy is used to maintain the real exchange 
rate. By contrast with the two positions just described, the present 
author argues that inflationary pressure derives from the same 
mechanisms as stimulate faster growth (and from rapid growth 
itself) and can be controlled by the fiscal and monetary policies 
which need to accompany exchange-rate policy.
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regards circumstances, inflationary pressures will 
differ depending on how fully employed the labour 
force and other resources are; for example, these 
pressures will be lower coming out of  a recession 
than after several years of growth, since the latter 
naturally tends to employ installed capacity and 
come up against bottlenecks.
The boost given to aggregate demand by a 
competitive exchange rate is hard to pin down and 
quantify. Among the mechanisms involved are the 
relative prices it influences. It is very difficult to 
arrive at an accurate appreciation of the scale and 
evolution of these effects. To begin with, it is not 
easy to estimate the complex effects of relative prices 
on aggregate demand. The difficulty has been even 
greater in recent economic history because other 
expansionary forces, deriving from the higher export 
prices obtained by many developing economies, have 
operated through the same mechanism.
Again, relative price effects are not the only 
expansionary mechanism created by this regime. A 
depreciated real exchange rate and a current-account 
surplus create expectations of real-term appreciation 
and lead to portfolio shifts that favour local assets, 
including real estate and also consumer durables. As 
with relative prices, these positive financial effects have 
recently been combined with factors deriving from the 
international context, as international interest rates 
have been low for much of the present decade.
Although the scale and evolution of  the 
screr effect on aggregate demand may be difficult 
to pinpoint, we do know that the higher growth 
experienced by economies which adopt an screr5 
is partly due to this effect, although we cannot judge 
its relative importance or how this varies from one 
country to another or over time. It seems reasonable 
to assume, for example, that the relative impact of 
the different expansionary effects differs from one 
country to another and also varies over time in each. 
Because of  the uncertainties mentioned, it is very 
difficult, if  not impossible, to carry out fine-tuning 
with exchange-rate policy to regulate aggregate 
demand growth by altering the real exchange rate. 
There is known to be a positive association between 
the real exchange rate and growth, but it is not 
known if  this relationship is non-linear, if  there are 
thresholds, or how it differs from one country to 
5 A number of  recent international comparative studies have 
presented further evidence on the correlation between growth 
and the real exchange rate. See, for example, Prasad, Rajan and 
Subramanian (2006) and Rodrik (2007).
another and over time. The basic knowledge required 
to carry out fine-tuning with monetary policy is 
thus not available. Furthermore, experimenting with 
exchange-rate policy seems wholly unadvisable in 
the absence of the knowledge needed to implement 
a fine-tuning exchange-rate policy whereby a new 
real exchange-rate target could be set from time to 
time with reasonably accuracy. As already noted, 
the main objective of an screr policy is to reduce 
uncertainty in agents’ investment and employment 
decisions. Thus, experimental and uncertain changes 
in the exchange-rate target would have very adverse 
effects on the main policy objective.
To sum up, the screr regime differs from other 
policy contexts in one crucial aspect: exchange-
rate policy in this regime is a permanent driver of 
demand growth which can give rise to inflationary 
pressure, and it is unlikely that this stimulus can be 
regulated by fine-tuning exchange-rate policy. These 
special characteristics of the regime mean that the 
policies required to accompany exchange-rate policy 
must also have special features: the permanent 
expansionary stimulus that is part and parcel of the 
regime heightens the importance of the restraining 
role to be played by fiscal and monetary policy. In 
general, fiscal and monetary macroeconomic policies 
are designed to control aggregate demand and may be 
expansionary or contractionary. This holds true with 
the screr regime, but in that regime the accelerator 
is permanently pressed down. In principle, therefore, 
it is fiscal and monetary policy that are responsible 
for controlling the speed of  expansion, i.e., for 
regulating the rate of  aggregate demand growth. 
Because the accelerator is permanently down, the 
most important regulatory function of these policies 
is to know when to press the brake.
These considerations lead macroeconomists, 
and particularly Keynesian economists, into little-
known territory. Monetary policy has been the 
subject of considerable debate, and there is a long 
track record of experience in this area, because for 
many years it has borne the main responsibility 
for controlling aggregate demand in developed 
and developing economies. There is also a large 
body of  experience and analysis concerning the 
expansionary role of  fiscal policy. But it is a fact 
that debate and experience are lacking when it comes 
to the restraining role of fiscal policy. In the screr 
regime, macroeconomic policy has to find its own 
way. Conducting it requires creativity and permanent 
monitoring of economic data and of the consistency 
of exchange-rate, monetary and fiscal policy.
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This section will analyse whether, under an screr 
regime, there is sufficient economic autonomy for 
monetary policy to be conducted. It finds that 
there can usually be enough monetary autonomy 
to make an active monetary policy practicable. The 
regulatory power of  monetary policy is examined 
further on, in section IV; the conclusion there is that 
monetary policy cannot be relied upon to carry the 
main burden of controlling aggregate demand in an 
screr regime, which underscores the importance 
of fiscal policy.
The main orthodox objection to the competitive 
exchange-rate policy is that it would entail a loss of 
monetary autonomy. This criticism is based on the 
well-known “trilemma” of economies open to capital 
movements. The “trilemma” asserts that the central 
bank cannot simultaneously control the exchange 
rate and the interest rate in a context of free capital 
movements. As will be seen below, the “trilemma” is 
false in particular circumstances, and is thus false as 
a general characterization of open economies.
The condition for combining control of  the 
exchange rate with the preservation of  monetary 
autonomy is the existence of  an excess supply of 
international currency at the exchange rate targeted 
by the central bank. In these circumstances, the 
monetary authority can set the exchange rate by 
purchasing the excess supply in the currency market 
and can control the interest rate by sterilizing the 
monetary effects of this intervention, which it does by 
issuing treasury or central bank bonds in the money 
market. The central bank has two instruments for 
achieving its two goals: intervention in the currency 
market to set the exchange rate and intervention in 
the money market to determine the interest rate.
An excess supply of international currency, at 
the exchange rate targeted by the central bank and 
at the current interest rate, implies an excess demand 
for local assets. Fully sterilized intervention can be 
seen as a policy that is implemented in two stages. 
In the first, central bank intervention in the currency 
market leads to an increase in the monetary base. As 
a result there is a larger monetary base, an unaltered 
stock of local assets and an interest rate lower than 
it was initially. In the second stage, full sterilization 
completely offsets the change in the private-sector 
portfolio that occurred in the first stage. The central 
bank absorbs the increase in the monetary base and 
issues an amount of local assets equivalent to the 
initial excess demand for these assets (the excess 
supply of currency), returning the local interest rate 
to its earlier level.
An excess supply of  international currency 
at the exchange rate targeted by the central bank 
is what invalidates the “trilemma” and empowers 
that bank to set the exchange rate and the interest 
rate. This idea appears to be unfamiliar because 
studies analysing monetary autonomy and currency 
regimes and policies rarely address conditions in 
which there is an excess supply of  international 
currency, mainly concentrating instead on situations 
of balance-of-payments deficit. But the effects of a 
competitive exchange-rate policy on the current and 
capital accounts tend to create the conditions which 
invalidate the “trilemma” and allow for a degree of 
monetary autonomy.
Sterilized intervention to purchase currency is 
possible at any time. But can this policy be applied 
continuously? Not in every circumstance. The 
sustainability of the policy depends on the interest 
rate earned by international reserves, on the local 
interest rate, on the exchange-rate trend and on the 
evolution of the variables determining the supply of 
and demand for base money. The main conclusion of a 
recent paper by this author (Frenkel, 2007) is that there 
is a maximum local interest rate above which the policy 
of  sterilization becomes unsustainable. According 
to that study, under conditions of excess supply of 
international currency at the targeted exchange rate 
(which usually obtain in an screr regime), the 
central bank can set the exchange rate and is free to 
set a local interest rate no higher than that maximum 
without creating an unsustainable situation.
1. The cost of sterilization and the degree of 
monetary autonomy
At any point in time, the unit cost of sterilization 
is s = I – r – e, where s is the cost of sterilization, 
I the local interest rate, r the international interest 
III
Monetary autonomy in the screr regime
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rate and e = dE/E (E = pesos / US$) the rate of 
increase in the price of the international currency. 
The sterilization cost s is nil if  I = r + e, i.e., if  
the local interest rate is equal to the sum of  the 
international interest rate and the rate of increase 
in the exchange rate. Or (what comes to the same 
thing) if  the uncovered interest parity condition is 
strictly met.
A policy of sterilization is obviously sustainable 
if  the cost of sterilization is nil or negative. If this 
were the sustainability condition, the policy of 
sterilization would only be sustainable if  I ≤ r + e, 
i.e., r + e would be the maximum value of  the 
interest rate needed to keep the policy of sterilization 
sustainable. Rates higher than this would make the 
policy unsustainable.6
Frenkel (2007) showed that the condition 
referred to was not necessary for sustainability. It 
demonstrated that the policy could be sustainable 
with local interest rates higher than r + e and 
calculated the maximum rate at which sterilization 
remained sustainable. This conclusion was arrived 
at simply by considering the stock of central bank 
liabilities and taking into account the seigniorage 
received by the bank. The study cited formulated 
a simple model which took account of  the fact 
that, in addition to interest-bearing financial assets, 
the public demands and the central bank issues a 
monetary base which is not interest-bearing. Note 
that if  the intention were to determine the maximum 
interest rate at which the cost of  sterilization 
operations was nil or negative, seigniorage could 
6 It could be argued that the definition of  sustainability used 
here is too restrictive because it focuses exclusively on the central 
bank’s balance sheet and assets. Certainly, the sustainability of 
a sterilization policy could be analysed with reference to the 
consolidated balance sheet of the public sector and central bank, 
so that any deficit that might be incurred by the bank through 
its sterilization operations was covered by fiscal transfers. With 
that approach, however, discussion of  the sustainability of  a 
sterilization policy becomes a discussion about the sustainability 
of  the consolidated public debt. This latter perspective 
encompasses numerous issues, among which the sustainability 
of a sterilization policy would not feature prominently. With the 
approach used here, on the other hand, a precise answer can be 
given to the question of whether sterilization is sustainable, and 
the degree of monetary autonomy can be defined and calculated. 
If  a policy of sterilization is sustainable under this definition of 
sustainability, then it is also sustainable from the perspective of 
the consolidated accounts of the public sector and central bank. 
The restrictiveness of the definition of sustainability employed 
here derives mainly from the direction given to the controversy: 
this paper takes issue with those who argue that when an economy 
is open to capital flows, a policy of sterilization is not sustainable 
and there can be no monetary autonomy.
not be added. Since what is to be demonstrated, 
however, is not a nil cost but the sustainability of 
all central bank monetary and financial operations 
taken together, the seigniorage total can be included 
in the calculation, as indeed could other revenue 
items, such as returns on commercial bank debt 
and public bonds. The present study takes account 
of seigniorage alone.
The degree of monetary autonomy is defined here 
as the difference between the maximum local interest 
rate at which sterilization is sustainable and r + e. 
Thus, g = imax – (r + e), where imax is this maximum 
rate and g the degree of monetary autonomy.
Given the international interest rate and the 
rate of increase in the exchange rate, the higher the 
local interest rate that can be set without rendering 
the policy of sterilization unsustainable, the greater 
the degree of autonomy.
2. The sustainability condition and the permanence
 of the degree of monetary autonomy
This section briefly presents the model from which 
the conclusions referred to derive. It is assumed that 
the central bank has international reserves as its only 
asset and that it issues two liabilities, base money 
and sterilization bills, yielding local interest rate i.
P = B + L
where P is the total stock of central bank liabilities, 
B the outstanding monetary base and L the 
stock of  interest-bearing liabilities. At interest 
rate I and exchange rate E there is an excess 
supply of international currency C in the currency 
market, which the central bank purchases. R is the 
central bank’s stock of  international reserves (in 
international currency) and R E is the peso value 
of these reserves. The international reserves yield r, 
the international interest rate.
Again, with interest rate I determined, the 
increase in demand for base money is dB = B β (p 
+ y), where p is the inflation rate, y the real gdp 
growth rate and β the nominal gdp-elasticity of 
monetary demand.
The sustainability condition of the sterilization 
policy is defined as dP ≤ d(R E).
The condition means that the sterilization 
policy is sustainable if  the ratio between total 
central bank liabilities and the local-currency 
value of  international reserves P/(R E) does not 
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increase. Frenkel (2007) shows that the sustainability 
condition is I ≤ (e + r) / lR, where lR = L/R E is 
the quotient between the stock of interest-bearing 
central bank liabilities and the local-currency value 
of international reserves.
If  lR < 1, the local interest rates required to 
preserve the sustainability of the sterilization policy 
can be greater than e + r, and the lower the lR 
quotient is, the higher they can be. As pointed out 
earlier, central bank operations determine the local 
interest rate and exchange rate at every point in time. 
The sustainability of these operations depends on 
the local and international rates, on lR and also on 
the trajectory of the exchange rate over time.
The maximum local interest rate at which the 
sterilization policy remains sustainable is imax = (r 
+ e) / lR. Consequently, the degree of  monetary 
autonomy is g = imax – (r + e) = (r + e) (1 – lR) / 
lR. The lower lR is, the higher the degree of monetary 
autonomy, i.e., the difference between the highest 
sustainable local rate and r + e.
The lR ratio varies over time, altering the 
range of  sustainable interest rates and the degree 
of  monetary autonomy. If  lR increases over time, 
the degree of autonomy tends to diminish, and vice 
versa. This consideration indicates that it would be 
advisable to analyse the trend of the sustainability 
condition to establish whether the highest interest rate 
consistent with a sustainable policy of sterilization 
tends to rise or fall over time. Or, what comes to the 
same thing, whether the evolution of the monetary 
variables and the currency market tends to increase 
or reduce the degree of monetary autonomy.
Frenkel (2007) defined the permanence condition 
of the degree of monetary autonomy as:
d(L/R E) = dlR ≤ 0
If the monetary and currency market variables 
meet this condition, the highest sustainable interest rate
and the degree of autonomy tend to remain stable or 
increase. If they do not meet it, the degree of autonomy 
tends to fall, although this does not mean that the 
sterilization policy rapidly becomes unsustainable.
The study cited showed that the permanence 
condition of  the degree of  autonomy could be 
expressed as a constraint on the local interest rate:
I ≤ (e + r) + (B/L) β (p + y) – (C/R)(1 – lR) / lR
Local rates equal to or lower than the second 
member of the expression are required to maintain 
the degree of  autonomy over time. Higher rates 
imply that the degree of  autonomy is tending to 
fall, because the ratio between the central bank’s 
stock of interest-bearing liabilities and its reserves 
is tending to rise. The constraint depends on the 
ratio between the monetary base and the stock of 
interest-bearing central bank liabilities (B/L) and on 
the rate of growth in the demand for base money 
β (p + y). As can be seen in the last term of the 
expression, the constraint depends negatively on the 
ratio between the flow of central bank purchases in 
the currency market and the stock of reserves (C/
R) (equivalent to the rate of international reserves 
growth, net of  interest). The insight is clear: the 
greater the purchases of  the central bank in the 
currency market, the more quickly the stock of 
sterilization liabilities and their cost will increase.
The above analysis assumes freedom of 
capital movements. Over and above the theoretical 
discussion, however, it highlights the functions that 
can be performed by controls on capital inflows 
and foreign currency purchases by the government. 
Capital controls that moderate the scale of central 
bank purchasing help preserve whatever degree of 
autonomy is possessed by the economy at a given 
time. In the same way, fiscal policy can also help 
preserve autonomy. If  there is a fiscal surplus, 
the government can invest part of  that surplus in 
external assets, thereby reducing the amounts the 
central bank needs to purchase to keep the exchange 
rate on target.
In summary, the conclusions arrived at in 
Frenkel (2007) are as follows. If  the conditions 
I ≤ (e + r) / lR and also I ≤ (e + r) + (B/L) β 
(p + y) – (C/R)(1 – lR) / lR are met, the policy 
of  sterilization is sustainable and the degree of 
autonomy is permanent.
Conversely, if  (e + r) + (B/L) β (p + y) – (C/
R)(1 – lR) / lR < I ≤ (e + r) / lR, the sterilization 
policy is sustainable but the degree of  autonomy 
tends to diminish.
The study cited presents a number of numerical 
exercises, involving different inflation and growth 
scenarios and using plausible data and parameters. 
The results suggest that sterilization policies are 
sustainable and that a considerable degree of 
permanent monetary autonomy exists in contexts 
that are by no means uncommon in many developing 
economies. The conclusion must be that exchange-
rate policy in an screr regime does not usually 
inhibit the exercise of monetary policy. The orthodox 
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criticism is not valid. Even with freedom of capital 
movements (on the obvious assumption that domestic 
and external assets are not perfect substitutes), this 
regime is not incompatible with a considerable degree 
of monetary autonomy.
3. A digression to specify and generalize the 
foregoing conclusions
The model used earlier to analyse sterilization assumed 
a greatly simplified financial structure. Agents’ 
investment portfolios include base money, local assets 
and external assets. There are only two interest rates, 
the local rate and the international rate.
The foregoing analysis of  sterilization is 
based on the following reasoning. Given a certain 
configuration of  investment portfolios and a 
certain interest rate structure, it is reasonable to 
assume an increased preference for local assets, for 
whatever reason. At the rates in force, this change 
leads to excess demand for local assets and the 
corresponding excess supply of external assets. Since 
the central bank issues the very local asset that is 
in demand (the only interest-bearing local asset in 
the model), a monetary policy of maintaining the 
local interest rate implies full sterilization of  the 
monetary base issued as a result of interventions to 
purchase currency in the market. With this model, 
maintaining the interest rate is equivalent to full 
sterilization or, what comes to the same thing, to 
keeping the stock of base money unchanged.
How is the analysis affected by the existence of 
a wider range of local assets? To examine this point, 
a somewhat more complex model with two interest-
bearing local assets is considered here. It is assumed 
that the range of local assets consists of base money 
and two interest-bearing assets: short-term assets 
and long-term assets (bonds or shares, for example). 
It is also assumed that the central bank operates 
only in the market for short-term assets. Now let it 
be assumed that the excess demand for local assets 
resulting from the change of  preferences posited 
above is distributed in some way between short- and 
long-term local assets. The first step in the central 
bank operation (the purchasing of surplus foreign 
currency to maintain the exchange rate) would result 
in lower short- and long-term local interest rates than 
the starting rates. In this case, if the central bank fully 
sterilized the base money it issued via the placement 
of short-term assets, the resulting short-term interest 
rate would be higher than the starting rate. This is 
because the long-term rate would be lower than it 
was to begin with and if the elasticity of substitution 
between base money and short- and long-term assets 
were significant, the demand for base money would 
be higher than at the start. To keep the amount of 
base money equal to the original amount, the short-
term interest rate would have to be higher than its 
starting level to compensate for the effects of a lower 
long-term interest rate.
The rise in the short-term interest rate in the 
above exercise comes about because the central 
bank, which operates exclusively with short-term 
assets, carries out full sterilization of  its currency 
market interventions. Conversely, if  the central 
bank wishes to restore the short-term interest rate 
to its starting level (because this is its monetary 
policy instrument, for example), it can do so. This 
will involve conducting a partial rather than full 
sterilization, allowing the supply of base money to 
adapt to higher demand via the influence of a long-
term rate that is lower than the starting rate.
The example using three local assets illustrates 
a more general case: a large quantity of local assets, 
including land and buildings, that are in demand as 
a counterpart to the excess supply of external assets. 
Obviously the central bank cannot control the entire 
interest rate structure, whether in an open or a closed 
economy. The monetary autonomy exercised through 
the sterilization policy needs to be understood as the 
capacity of the monetary authority to control the 
instrument rate of its monetary policy. The variable 
targeted by the sterilization policy ought to be the 
interest rate of  the assets with which the central 
bank operates and not an underlying quantitative 
variable (or other monetary variable).
There have been cases in practice (and this is 
often brought up) where sterilization policies have 
induced higher local interest rates. The foregoing 
analysis offers a possible explanation for these cases. 
If  the central bank pursues quantitative monetary 
targets (e.g., for underlying quantitative variables 
or other monetary variables) and fully sterilizes 
its currency market purchases to meet them, the 
interest rate of the asset class with which the bank 
is operating is likely to rise. In this case the problem 
lies not in the nature of the sterilization policy but 
in the goal it is pursuing.
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1. A simplified model for studying demand 
regulation
To consider the potential for monetary policy 
to become the main instrument in controlling 
aggregate demand, a simplified macroeconomic 
model including only the variables being analysed 
will now be presented. For example, lagged variables 
and expectations are excluded from the equation 
describing the growth rate of  the economy and 
inflationary expectations are excluded from the 
equation describing the inflation rate. Excluding 
expectations deprives the model of an important anti-
inflation policy mechanism, but this simplification 
makes it easier to present the arguments without 
loss of generality. For the same reason, the model 
is presented in a deterministic fashion.
The economic growth rate y is given by the 
equation:
 y = y + a1 ER + a2 (I – p) + a3 f (1)
where the parameters are a1 > 0; a2 < 0; a3 > 0. ER 
is the log of the real exchange rate and f represents 
the fiscal impulse. ER > 0 implies a competitive 
exchange rate that stimulates growth. F > 0 
implies an expansionary fiscal impulse and f < 0 a 
contractionary impulse.
The inflation rate p is:
 p = b1 ρ–1 + b2 (e + p*) + b3 (y – y) (2)
where the parameters are b1 > 0; b2 > 0; b1 + b2 = 
1; b3 > 0, and where p* is the international inflation 
rate.
The functional form of  the model makes it 
necessary to restrict the parameter values. For a rise 
in the nominal interest rate to be contractionary 
and deflationary, i.e., (dy/di) < 0 and (dp/di) < 0, it 
is necessary for (1 + b3 a2) > 0.
Note that y = y → p = b1 ρ–1 + b2 (e + p*). 
That is, the inflation rate is an average of the past 
rate and the rate of increase in tradable goods prices. 
If  exchange-rate policy additionally keeps the real 
exchange rate stable, e = p – p* → p = p–1.
The inflation rate thus remains stable. 
Consequently, with an exchange-rate policy that 
keeps the real exchange rate stable, y is the rate 
of  growth that neither accelerates nor decelerates 
inflation. This rate is not assumed to be a constant. 
The assumption is merely that at each moment 
in time there will be a certain rate of  growth at 
which the economy tends to keep the inflation 
rate stable.
2. The screr policy and exclusively monetary 
anti-inflation policy
The model defined will now be used to examine 
an screr policy and an exclusively monetary 
anti-inflation policy. In other words, it is assumed 
that ER > 0; that the exchange-rate policy applied 
maintains the stable real exchange rate e = p – p* 
and that the fiscal impulse is nil: f = 0. Monetary 
policy is applied using a truncated Taylor rule: I = 
θ p, with policy parameter θ > 1.
The sustainability of  this policy is examined 
first of  all. For the reasons explained above, the 
sustainability of the sterilization policy requires:
i = θ p ≤ (e + r) / lR = (p – p* + r) / lR ,
whence θ ≤ [1+ (r – p*)/p] / lR
In other words, the parameter θ must not be 
greater than the second member of the expression. 
Note that with lR < 1 and plausible values for the 
real international interest rate and for the inflation 
rate, θ can sustainably take values significantly 
higher than 1.
The anti-inflationary goal of monetary policy will 
now be considered. If inflation is not to accelerate, it 
is necessary for y = y, whence, because of equation 
(1), it follows that a1 ER + a2 (I – p) = 0.
When interest rate I is replaced in this expression 
by the policy rule, the result is that θ = 1 – a1 ER / a2 p
(with a2 < 0).
As can be seen, the ability of monetary policy 
to control inflation depends on the size of a2, the 
interest rate elasticity of  aggregate demand. If  
IV
The potential of monetary policy
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elasticity a2 were low, the interest rate needed to 
control inflation (and the θ parameter) would have 
to be higher. In this case, it is possible that
θ =1 – a1 ER / a2 p > [1+ ( r – p*)/p] / lR
In other words, the monetary policy needed to 
control inflation would not be sustainable. If  this 
were the case, the interest rate policy of the screr 
regime should be to keep within the sustainable 
maximum (which would be insufficient to prevent 
inflation accelerating via this route) and aggregate 
demand should be controlled mainly by fiscal 
impulse f.7
3. The interest rate elasticity of aggregate 
demand
Consideration will now be given to some empirical 
evidence on the magnitude of  the interest rate 
elasticity of aggregate demand in Latin American 
economies. Empirical analyses of recent experience 
with inflation targeting policies in Brazil and Mexico 
will be reviewed, the basis for this being two studies on 
Brazil (Barbosa-Filho, 2006 and 2008), one on Mexico 
(Galindo and Ros, 2008) and one covering a number 
of Latin American economies (Chang, 2007).
The studies on the Brazilian and Mexican 
economies cited above do not contain direct 
estimates of the interest rate elasticity of aggregate 
demand. What they do contain, however, are 
analyses (based on different methodologies) of 
the transmission mechanisms of  the interest rate 
policy involved in inflation targeting systems. Their 
conclusions indicate that the interest rate elasticity 
of aggregate demand is low.
The analysis of  Mexico covers the 1995-2004 
period and that of Brazil the 1999-2006 period. In 
both cases there was an initial phase of devaluation 
and accelerating inflation and a second phase of 
systematically slowing inflation associated with 
inflation targeting. In both cases, exchange-rate 
appreciation took place at the same time. What is 
of particular interest for the purposes of this study 
7 There are theoretical precedents for this conclusion. The 
Keynesian approach recognizes the possibility that aggregate 
demand may have low interest rate elasticity, the result being a 
weakening of monetary policy and a stronger role for fiscal policy. 
But this does seem a good time to revisit and highlight the issue, 
given the primacy acquired by inflation targeting policies in Latin 
America and many developed countries.
is the phase of  slowing inflation, which began in 
1998 in Mexico and 2003 in Brazil.
The second phase in these two cases can be 
summarized by describing the stylized facts they 
have in common. In both, there was a progressive 
deceleration of  inflation, a tendency towards 
exchange-rate appreciation and low economic growth 
rates. These stylized facts were the main focus of the 
studies referred to, which tried to explain them, in 
a disaggregated form, as the effects of the policies 
applied through interest rates.
In accounting for the slowing of  inflation, 
the academics from the two countries highlighted 
exchange-rate appreciation (the pass-through8 
mechanism) as the leading factor. For both countries, 
emphasis was laid on the negative relationship 
between interest rate I and the exchange-rate trend 
e. The anti-inflation policy of  high interest rates 
resulted in a supply of  international currency 
that created an appreciating trend in the exchange 
rate. Although the Mexican and Brazilian central 
banks intervened to purchase currency in the 
periods analysed, these interventions did not alter 
the direction of  the market trend. The exchange 
rate tended to strengthen, and this was the most 
significant factor in the slowdown of  inflation. It 
was the exchange rate, and not the rate of aggregate 
demand growth, that acted as the main transmission 
mechanism linking interest rates to inflation rates.
Again, the Mexico study attributed the low 
economic growth rate to the influence of  real 
exchange-rate appreciation. This factor was also 
mentioned in the case of  Brazil, although no 
empirical evidence was presented for this. The Brazil 
study left open the possibility that low growth rates 
might also be associated with the high real interest 
rates of the period.
The conclusions of these studies can be expressed 
in terms of the model shown earlier, the results being 
interpreted as estimates of  the significance and 
magnitude of the model coefficients.
Regarding the inflation rate, expressed in 
equation (2), both countries’ studies highlighted 
the significance of coefficient b2, which relates the 
inflation rate to the nominal exchange-rate trend. 
There is no evidence concerning the significance of 
8 The term “pass-through” refers to the effect of exchange-rate 
fluctuations on the general price level, whatever the channels of 
transmission.
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coefficient b3, which relates the inflation rate to the 
growth rate. Regarding the growth rate, expressed 
in equation (1), the Mexico study particularly 
emphasized the significance of coefficient a1, which 
relates that rate to the level of the real exchange rate. 
None of  the studies presented empirical evidence 
on the significance of  coefficient a2, which relates 
the real interest rate to the growth rate. As already 
indicated, however, there is the possibility that the 
coefficient may have been significant, albeit small, in 
the case of Brazil, to judge by the high real interest 
rates observed in the Brazilian economy.
In summary, the analyses of  transmission 
mechanisms in recent Brazilian and Mexican 
experience with inflation targeting policies find that 
the interest rate elasticity of  aggregate demand is 
low. This characteristic in the economies of Brazil 
and Mexico is probably shared with other economies 
that have similar levels of financial intermediation. 
The conclusions given reinforce the idea that in an 
screr regime, or more generally in contexts where 
preventing exchange-rate appreciation is a goal, it 
cannot be incumbent upon monetary policy alone to 
control aggregate demand, which means that fiscal 
policy has to bear the greater part of the burden.
(Original: Spanish)
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